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Abstract 
This research uses the “Participating Observation Method” to observe the interaction between 
manufacturer and distributor negotiation strategies, determine the preference and expectation 
of participants, and establish a framework for this type of research. Then it sets up the 
“analysis framework of negotiation strategies” between the manufacturer and the distributor 
based on an analysis of the respective conditions, advantages, and disadvantages of the 
manufacturer and distributor. Thirdly, this study sets up a reward matrix of the strategy action 
game between the manufacturer and the distributor. Then establishes a set of feasible 
“negotiation models” based on the reward matrix of the strategy game between the both 
parties to observe how the manufacturer and the distributor make their own bargaining 
decisions in the situation of information asymmetry or exterior opportunity/threat. Finally, this 
study establishes a “multi-agent strategy game protocol system model” to solve the conflict 
resulting from the self-strategizing of both parties for their own interests, and to achieve the 
utmost efficiency in the negotiation.  
Keywords: strategy action game; conflict resolution; multi-agent 
1. Introduction  
The development of sales channel is based on cooperation between enterprises, despite 
potential conflict between them in commercial dealings. Due to differences in position and 
role between parties, the channel right problem derives from the agent relationship between 
the manufacturer and distributor, resulting in constant alternation between competition and 
cooperation. The manufacturer suspects that the distributor monopolizes market information, 
lacks brand loyalty, delays payment, and rejects the goods; correspondingly, the distributor is 
dissatisfied when the manufacturer frequently increases the purchase price, threatens to 
terminate the agent relationship, is out of stock, and delays delivery. Thus, both parties are 
suspicious of, and in conflict with, each other. Negotiation takes place because of conflicts in 
both parties’ price expectations. The uncertainty of negotiations makes it difficult for both 
parties to arrive at an optimal decision in complex situations. Competition and cooperation 
always characterize the relationship between the manufacturer and distributor; conflict 
ultimately occurs if the manufacturer and distributor approach negotiations seeking only their 
own interests. The opinions of the both parties may be contrary or incompatible, thus 
requiring compromise. At least one party must change its position, or the conflict will remain 
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2. Strategy Action Game Theory  
Strategy action uses strategies to change the faith, idea, or actions of others. It also restricts its 
own action and increases its interests. Jun and Zhili [11] argued that in a game, each 
participant will have the desire to control the game, except when a party is authoritative or 
preponderant. This control action, either in between a board or in private, is strategy action. 
Credibility is the key of strategy action, and strategy action functions based on mutual 
confidence. Strategy action controls the rules of the game, and action sequence and original 
reward may change due to strategy action [8]. The primary strategy actions include three 
categories: commitment, threat, and promise [9]. The objective of using these three strategy 
actions is for a party to turn the situation to its advantage while making the other party believe 
the condition occurred naturally from the beginning [11]. 
In addition to being credible, a strategy action must be observable and irreversible. Take a 
manufacturer and a distributor for example. If the manufacturer does not find the decision of 
distributor, it cannot respond naturally, and the actions of both parties will be irrelevant. If the 
manufacturer has to hold a certain channel (irreversible), it will make a action and expect a 
response from the distributor, and then adjust its action in its interest. Therefore, the variables 
of strategy action are observable and irreversible [3], [7], [15]. Strategy action includes two 
categories [11]: 
2.1 Unconditional Strategy Action   
Channels dominate the market; those who control the channels maintain relative advantage. If 
a distributor declares its standpoint at first and indicates an observable and irreversible 
strategy, its action is unconditional, and the distributor will take the declared action regardless 
of how the cooperative manufacturer responds. If the manufacturer believes the declaration, it 
indicates that the declaration is credible, and the strategy action of distributor will be 
“commitment.” 
If both parties are equal in advantage and their commitment is credible, the opinion and 
response of the other party may change; this commitment has the innate advantage of making 
the other party change with the change of an independent variable. For example, Watson’s 
minimum price strategy first serves the cooperative manufacturer and then the consumer. 
2.2 Conditional Strategy Action 
Conditional strategy action changes with the set objective. A distributor may bring pressure if 
it wishes to prevent the manufacturer from making any decision (i.e. “if you don’t___I 
will___”);. In contrast, it will give more inducement and encouragement if it wishes to attract 
the other party to achieve or support its expectation (i.e. “if you can___, I will be able 
to___”); this is a promise. In the realm of technology, threats influence the subsequent game 
strategy. The threat usually implies the promise, but it does not clarify directly; the 
subsequent promise is naturally credible if the threat is valid. The reward determines the scale 
of the threat and the promise; the difference is that the former provides a bad result, while the 
later provides a good result. If the distributor threatens the manufacturer, the encouragement 
to the manufacturer in the future will decrease; if the distributor creates favorable conditions 
to attract the manufacturer, the ultimate interest of the manufacturer will increase, and vice 
versa. 
3. Conflict Resolution  
Strategies and models of conflict resolution have become increasingly abundant in the last ten 
years. The strategies include random index, compromise, compulsive index, object index, 
case-based parameter aggregative index, object modification, combination, and relaxation [1], 
[6], [10]. 
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• Random Index: This strategy can be effective and provide many answers for the 
existing problems if a little effort is made in the process of plan development, 
allowing the preferential selection of the best answer [2]. 
• Compromise: This is a tempered strategy for solving conflicts, which finds the value 
that best represents all the conflicting viewpoints. In other words, all the values in 
the opinion may be modified. The common manner of compromise is to adopt the 
mean value (naturally, this strategy only works for numerical value) [4]. If the values 
are not all dispersed equally, the ensuing result may contain a deviation. The pattern 
and median may lead to a better result in this condition, and the statistical method 
may be useful if the values are large. 
• Compulsive Index: This strategy is similar to compromise, but is used when the 
agents are unalterable, and therefore have strong confidence in the problematic value 
or are restricted from implementation [5]. Both parties develop a new choice to 
accommodate the special requirements of agents. 
• Object Index: This is necessary if the conflict occurs in a large variable, or if the 
agents do not recognize the conflict. The index occurs if the original plan is 
abandoned. This method may lead to many different plans in the hierarchy where the 
conflict occurs, and it is useful to change the system from the stable level and search 
for a new field [12]. 
• Case-based Parameter Aggregative Index: This strategy improves a parameter when 
there are many conflicted parameters and the evaluation on the case is much lower. 
The resolution is used when the conflict has a variable on an effective problem. The 
setting of this action is equivalent to making a separate alteration. 
• Object Modification and Combination: This is the most expensive strategy, and is 
used when all the other methods fail, or the problem is believed to be suppressed 
[13]. When the mutually defined structure of an object is established, it is expected 
to enter a new search field [9]. 
• Relaxation: Some related variables should be relaxed and modified to solve certain 
conflicts. This strategy is applicable for low-level conflicts involving variance. The 
variance may be any numerical value or non-numerical value, and their value should 
be versatile and modifiable. There may be two answers for the relaxed conflict: 
variation conflict and variation compulsive conflict. 
4. Strategy Game of Multi-agent Conflict Resolution 
What follows is a description of the research method used in this paper, an analysis of 
manufacturer and distributor, the framework and game reward matrix, and the multi-agent 
strategy game protocol system. 
4.1. Participating Observation Method 
This study uses the “Participating Observation Method” in property research. The 
participating observation method is a kind of field observation or direct observation. The 
researcher will establish and maintain a long-term multidimensional relationship with the 
group members, thus aiding the research. 
There are three practical ways to participate in the observation: 
• Complete Participation: The researcher permeates the activity of the research object, 
becoming a part of it and interacting with it, which may be the key to changing or 
ending the activity. 
• Research Participation: Enter into the research and participate in the relevant activity, 
while maintaining the identity of researcher. 
• Observer: Determine from outside the condition whether the research object knows 
or not, while neither engaging in the activity nor intervening in any circumstances. 
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Complete participation is inapplicable when the commercial standpoint is different and 
the actual interest negotiation is involved. Thus, research participation and observation are 
used to collect and interpret the data and perform analysis in this study. 
4.2. Strategy Action game 
Manufacturer and distributor expectation and satisfaction are the most important factors for 
the success of bargaining negotiations; one must therefore acquire the preference and 
expectation of a participant to make a bargaining negotiation as a participant. This study 
refers to the action strategy in the strategy action game of Jun and Zhili [11]. Figure 1 shows 
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Figure 1. Research framework 
4.3. Analysis on Manufacturer and Distributor 
M International Co. Ltd. is a baby diaper manufacturer. The case company was founded in 
1969, and initially its main operating item was cardboard man; it officially entered into the 
baby diapers industry in 1990. With the flourish development of the domestic consumption 
channel, the market ratio of the case company kept decreasing due to the strong competition 
of domestic and foreign products. The market ratio has stayed at approximately 5% in recent 
years. However, although the owner wants to recover its domain of former days, the case 
company has no choice but to compress the profit space and accept the terms of distributors 
due to the low industry entrance threshold, excessive potential competitors, and advantageous 
distributors. The company director thinks that in recent years the tripartite confrontation of 
brands has made it difficult for manufacturers to change the market ratio. 
D Co. Ltd. (D Company) was founded in 1963. Its main operating businesses are 
pesticide, supermarkets, and western medicine. It was listed in 1989. D Company is one of the 
biggest pesticide manufacturers in Taiwan, and pesticide manufacturing is its core enterprise. 
It established a supermarket department to take advantage of the existing marketing 
organizations and vegetable arrangement centers of relevant departments in the company. The 
commodities come directly from the producing area, have set up a chain of  supermarkets, 
and the promotion of their products’ freshness with a quality guarantee. It decreases the cost 
by bulk stock via the logistics center, benefits the customers, and improves the competitive 
force. To compete with other supermarkets and variety stores, D supermarket carries out a 
fresh food mart vision with a freshness guarantee, introduces new products actively and 
provides consumers with a convenient, tidy, comfortable, and one-stop shopping environment. 
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D supermarket presents itself as the “fine neighbor of freshness” and as a good co-worker of 
family living, enabling consumers to buy the freshest and healthiest materials with the most 
convenience and lowest prices.  
4.4. Establish the Analysis Framework of Negotiation Strategy Action 
After finishing the respective objective environment analysis of distributor and manufacturer, 
we find that their cooperation relationship is very delicate. The distributor is welcome even if 
the hot commodity does not pay the slotting fee; the manufacturer expectation expands the 
channel or pays more money for commodity circulation. There is an affiliation between the 
parties, and cooperation is necessary to obtain greater profits. After an agreement expires, 
slotting fees and reward negotiations become typical. Figure 2 shows the analysis framework 
of negotiation strategy action between manufacturer and distributor. This analysis is based on 
the established negotiation practices between manufacturers and distributors in traditional 
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Figure 2. Analysis framework of negotiation strategy action 
4.5. Establish the Game Reward Matrix of Strategy Action 
In our analysis of the strategy action application of manufacturer and distributor, we use 
commitment, threat, and promise strategy to research the game reward matrix. For example, 
in the case of a threat and promise strategy action application on the slotting fee, the 
manufacturer expects to reduce it, while the distributor expects to increase it. The conflict 
occurs even though both parties have the willingness to negotiate because of a consideration 
of interest, and the terms brought forward by each party are very different from the 
expectations of the other. The distributor may propose a strategy to improve the operation, 
and the manufacturer may propose a strategy to increase stock 30%. If both parties accept 
each other’s terms, the reward will be zero for each party. In other words, they maintain their 
status without a chance of cooperation. The most favorable for the distributor would be that 
the manufacturer accepts its resolution, while it does not accept the manufacturer’s resolution, 
yielding a reward of 1; for the manufacturer, the most favorable outcome would be that the 
distributor accepts its resolution to add 30% stock, while it does not accept the distributor’s 
resolution, yielding a reward of 1. If both parties do not accept each other’s terms, the reward 
will is –2. 
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0, 0 -1, 1 
Refuse adding 
30% stock 
1, -1 -2, -2 
Table 1. Game reward matrix of distributor and manufacturer 
4.6. Introduce the Multi-agent Conflict Resolution Concept into the Strategy Game 
Figure 3 shows the preparation of negotiation flow. When a negotiation fails, both parties 
should make the next negotiation following relevant arrangements and internal protocol. 
 
 
Figure 3. Negotiation flow 
The researcher observes and records the practical negotiation process between the 
distributor and manufacturer on the spot. Making the practical negotiation operating process 
and the strategy action game theory reflect each other and establishes a multi-agent model to 
analyze and check the strategy game reward matrix in the process of negotiation. Then 
discusses how to maintain common sense as each party insists on its interests under the 
individual ration principle and information asymmetry. The premises of the multi-agent 
model are as follows: 
(1) For the sake of analysis, the research framework supposes that the distributor and the 
manufacturer of the traditional industry product play a zero-sum game. The distributor 
is regarded as the agent D, and has two strategies: cooperative and uncooperative; the 
manufacturer is regarded as the agent M, and has two strategies: cooperative and 
uncooperative. Internal and external environments influence the negotiation standpoints 
of each party. Although both parties are willing to negotiate, due to the consideration of 
interest, the terms of each party are much different from the expectations of the other. It 
is at least a best game equilibrium under the premise that both parties agree to negotiate; 
therefore, another agent must act as the harmonizer (third party). This harmonizer, 
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labeled as agent C, is the conflict resolution agent required to solve the conflict. Table 2 






    Agent  M 







Table 2. Strategy reward matrix 
(2) Agent D and agent M share a common database, while they have their own repositories. 
This is because if agent D and agent M do not share a common database, agent D can 
access more confidential data relative to agent M, enabling agent D to make a more 
accurate decision than agent M for the specified problem. Therefore, the common 
database here means letting each agent access an opening database fairly without any 
restriction. 
(3) Agent D and agent M have the same importance. This is because if agent D is more 
important than agent M is, when they deliver their opinions to agent C, the value of 
agent D on a specified problem might be 0.4, while that of agent M might be 0.6. In the 
event that the decision rule of the research is to adopt the bigger value as the decision 
variable, then agent C should believe the suggestion of agent M because 0.6 is bigger 
than 0.4. However, if agent D is more important than agent M is in an organization—for 
example, if agent D has more experience than agent M does—then agent C should 
believe the suggestion of agent D. In this case, agent C will be confused in making the 




Figure 4. Multi-agent framework 
(4) The agent D and agent M must be mutually independent. If they are not dependent, they 
will influence each other when making the decision. Agent D must refer to the value of 
agent M when determining its decision variable, and agent M also must refer to that of 
agent D when determining its decision variable. The conflict resolution process will be 
more complex in this condition. 
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4.7. Establish Multi-agent Strategy Game Protocol System 
















Figure 5. Multi-agent strategy game protocol system model 
(1) Design third party agent mechanisms; the manufacturer agent, distributor agent, and the 
third party agent represent the harmonization mechanism between the both parties and 
the third party.  
(2) Resolve the strategy reward value of each party under the individual requirement 
restriction. 
(3) The manufacturer agent and the distributor agent send the strategy reward value to the 
third party agent at the same time.  
(4) The third party agent judges whether the received strategy reward values conflict with 
each other. 
(5) If conflict occurs, the third party agent should select the resolution rule in the 
decision-making rule database, implement the conflict resolution, send back the result 
to the manufacturer agent and distributor agent, and then judge whether the individual 
requirement has been satisfied. 
(6) If the result from the conflict resolution implemented by the third party agent cannot 
satisfy the individual requirement of any agent, another resolution rule will be selected 
from the decision-making rule database, and the conflict resolution will be implemented 
to produce another new result. This procedure will continue until the result can satisfy 
the requirements of all the agents. 
5. Development of Strategy 
This research’s mediation strategy defines the role as two persons who could adopt a strategy 
according to their company’s practical situation. Figure 6 shows the practical operation steps. 
The descriptions are as follows: 
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Figure 6. Flow chart of operations to find solution 
Step 1. Both companies enter all the strategies that will be adopted and open to the public in 
cooperation with the other company. It is not necessary to enter the strategies’ 
expected reward values. 
Step 2. The system will produce an m * n reward matrix (hereafter called Matrix Z1) 
according to the number of strategy both parties have entered. Suppose there are two 
companies—Company D and Company M. M represents the number of strategies 
Company D wants to adopt, and n represents the number of strategies Company M 
wants to adopt. At this point, the matrix includes any reward it has, and the system 
automatically produces all corresponding strategy combinations. 
 
 M M-1 M-2 … M-n 
D 
D-1     
D-2     
…     
D-m     
Table 3. System produces automatically initial reward matrix Z1 
Step 3. The system sends back all strategy combinations that it has automatically produced 
for Company D and Company M. The two parties arrange a sequence of all strategy 
combinations according to their situations and give ranking values from highest to 
lowest. Each party judges which strategy combination will benefit their company the 
most and assigns it the highest-ranking value for that judgment and conversely, if the 
strategy combination is not beneficial or even detrimental to their company, they will 
give it a lower ranking value. Both companies conduct the judgment securing 
maximum reward as their goal. In short, in this step both companies arrange the order 
of benefit degrees for all strategy combinations. 
Step 4. Fill out all corresponding columns in the Z1 Matrix with the row values of Step 3. 
Produce a two-person multi-strategy game reward matrix (hereafter called Z2) with 
reward values (please refer to Table 4). Then conduct a domination strategy judgment 
on the Z2 Matrix. In the reward matrix of game theory, if there is any dominating 
strategy (it is always better for a party to adopt one strategy over another), then a 
party should first conduct matrix simplification. Continuing is possible only after 
simplifying a matrix (hereafter called Z3). 
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M-1 M-2 … M-n 
D 
D-1 (Pd1, Pm1) (Pd2, Pm2) … (Pdn, Pmn) 
D-2 (Pd(n+1), Pm(n+1)) (Pd (n+2), Pm(n+2)) … (Pd2n, Pm2n) 
… … … … … 
D-m (Pd((m-1)n+1), Pm((m-1)n+1)) 
(Pd((m-1)n+2), 
Pm((m-1)n+2)) … (Pdmn, Pmmn) 
 (Pa1~Pamn：Represent the given value of row of various strategy combination 
for D Company, Pb1~Pbmn：Represent the given value of row of various strategy 
combination for M Company) 
Table 4. Reward Matrix Z2 
Step 5. Starting from the maximum reward value, confirm if Company D chooses the 
strategy with the maximum reward value, and whether Company M could secure the 
maximum reward value by adopting the responding strategy. If the answer is yes, the 
strategy combination possesses an equilibrium of solutions; if not, Company M 
should adopt a strategy with a larger reward value. Then in the same way, Company 
D must confirm that the strategy combination is the responding strategy that could 
secure the maximum reward. If the answer is yes, the strategy combination possesses 
an equilibrium of solutions; if not, Company D should adopt a strategy with a larger 
reward value. This process continues until finding an equilibrium solution. 
Step 6. If such a method of searching for optimal solutions does not yield an equilibrium 
solution, the system will continue to repeat the cycle of strategy combinations. At this 
point, the system will adopt a mixed strategy in game theory to find a solution. If a 
reward matrix leaves two strategies for Company D and also two strategies for 





D-1 （Pd1, Pm1） （Pd2, Pm2） 
D-2 （Pd3, Pm3） （Pd4, Pm4） 
(D-1~2: Represent two strategy options remaining for Company D; M-1~2: 
Represent two strategy options remaining for Company M; Pd1~d4: Represent the 
reward value corresponding to Company M’s perceived strategy combination; 
Pm1~m4: Represent the reward value corresponding to Company M’s perceived 
strategy combination) 
Table 5. Reward Matrix Z3 
Then divide Company D’s and Company M’s corresponding reward matrix into Za and 
Zb reward matrices. 
For Matrix Za, the calculation of mixed strategy [14] is as follows: 
Calculation 1. Conduct domination strategy judgment first. If the judgment can produce a 
mediation equilibrium solution, send back directly the strategy used by the equilibrium 
solution. If the judgment cannot produce an equilibrium solution and is an indefinite cycle, 
then proceed with the following actions. 
Calculation 2. According to the maximum and minimum theory, the attacking side (on the left 
side of reward matrix, representing D) can find the maximum expected benefit in the 
minimum reward options (hereafter called Max-d) whereas the defense side (on the upper 
side, representing M) can find the minimum expected loss in the maximum loss options 
(hereafter called Min-m). 
Calculation 3. The left side of mixed strategy is the attacking side (find expected benefit); the 
upper side is defense side (find expected loss). 
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A: Assume Company M chooses Strategy M-1  the probability of responding with 
Strategy D-1 is p1, and the probability of responding with Strategy D-2 is (1-p1). 
)11(1PEG(D) 3d1 pPp d −×+×=        (1) 
Assume Company M chooses Strategy M-2  the probability of responding with Strategy 
D-1 is p1, and the probability of responding with Strategy D-2 is (1-p1).  
)11(1PEG(D) 4d2 pPp d −×+×=  (2) 
Through (1) and (2), we could find the probability p. 
So the expected benefit of Company D is: M-1：EG(D) = (1)，M-2：EG(D) = (2) 
If (1), (2) > Max-a, it means that adopting a mixed strategy will lead to a higher expected 
benefit, which is why the attacking side adopts a mixed strategy to find a solution. Then the 
attacking side and defense side exchange for the convenience of calculation. 
B: Assume Company D chooses D-1Strategy  the probability of responding M-1 
Strategy is p2, and probability of responding M-2 is (1-p2). 
)21(2PEL(M) 2d1 pPp d −×+×=  (3) 
Assume Company D chooses D-2 Strategy the probability of responding M-1 Strategy is 
p2, and probability of responding M-2 is (1-p2).  
)21(2PEL(M) 4d3 pPp d −×+×=   (4) 
Through (3) and (4), we could find the probability p. 
So the expected loss of Company M is: D-1：EL(M) = (3)，D-2：EL(M) = (4) 
If (3), (4) < Max-a, then adopting mixed strategy will result in lower loss, which is why the 
defense side adopts a mixed strategy to find a solution. 
Finally, the system sends back the highest probability of strategy options, with the highest 
probability (for example, the probability “0.6” of D-1 means that if the game repeats 10 times, 
there will be six opportunities to adopt the D-1 strategy). If two strategies have the same 
probability, then the system sends back both strategies. Likewise, for Matrix Zb, the system 
conducts the same calculation of mixed strategies and sends back the strategy options (with 
the probability) of the maximum probability. If two strategies have the same probability, the 
system again sends back both strategies. 
Step 7. The system conducts the simplification of Matrix Z3 in the strategy options sent back 
with the values of probability, reserving the strategy options that it has sent back and 
ruling out strategy options that it has not sent back. The system will produce the 
following three results. 
Result 1. The system produces an equilibrium solution. For both parties, the simplified matrix 
leaves only the last strategy option. The strategy combination output is an optimal solution.  
Result 2. One party leaves one strategy option and the other party leaves two-strategy options. 
At this point,  the party leaving two strategy options will obtain a higher reward and then 
output the strategy combination it adopts. This strategy combination is the optimal solution. 
Result 3. Both parties keep two strategy options—that is, there is no change in Matrix Z3. 
Calculate the probability values of both parties’ strategy options and determine the probability 
value of each strategy option. Reserve the strategy options that have larger probability value 
in two options of each of both parties before output the strategy combination as an optimal 
solution. 
Although the mixed game solution is not the real equilibrium solution for the game, could 
the process can show both parties which strategy option has better probability for maximum 
reward. Therefore, the solution in Step 7 is “the proposed strategy combination most probable 
to yield the players an expected maximum reward.” 
6. Numerical Simulation 
Taking the manufacturer (M International Company, Ltd) and distributor (D Company, Ltd.) 
in the study as examples: 
Step 1: Input the strategy that both parties want to adopt.  
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In this example, there are two strategies for each party to explore. 
Manufacturer (M): 
(M-1) Increase stocking amount by 30% 
(M-2) Request priority positions on shelves for their goods 
Distributor (D): 
(D-1) Share operation rights with the manufacturer   
(D-2) Adjust stocking cycle 
Step 2: Put two strategies for each party into the reward matrix of the first stage.  
Here is a code representing the matrix. D represents the distributor and M represents the 
manufacturer. 
Step 3：Give an estimated expected reward value (replaced by ranking values, the left side of 
the matrix is composed of the distributor’s reward values, whereas the upper side is 
composed of the manufacturer’s reward values; refer to Table 3) according to 
strategies and responding strategies adopted by both parties.  
This paper does this to prevent too excessive differences between a strong company and 
weak company that would lead to the neglect of the weak side. It then checks if there is a 
domination strategy before simplifying the matrix (no domination strategy in the example). 
 
 M M-1 M-2 
D D-1 (3,1) (2,3) D-2 (1,4) (4,2) 
Table 6. The initial reward matrix 
Step 4：Start with the maximum value of D and find the optimal solution acceptable to both 
parties. Continue to do this until find an equilibrium solution accepted by both parties, 
or produce a repeated cycle. 
(1) The maximum of D will emerge when D adopts the D-2 strategy and M responds by 
adopting the M-2 strategy. At this point, M will find out if they could secure the 
maximum benefit when they respond with the M-2 strategy to D’s D-2 strategy. 
However, the matrix shows that they could secure a higher reward value if they respond 
with the M-1 strategy. 
(2) Repeating the action, D might choose a strategy, M respond with a strategy, M change 
the strategy and replace it with a different strategy that will enable it to secure a higher 
benefit, and D respond to the strategy. A responding route of strategy choice is 
produced as follows (one side adopts a strategy and expects the other side to respond 
with a strategy) [2]: D-2『M-2』＝＞  M-1『D-2』＝＞ D-1『M-1』 ＝＞ M-2『D-1』
＝＞ D-2『M-2』＝＞ M-1『D-2』… 
(3) As the route emerges in the above-mentioned process of finding a solution, it has to 
adopt a mixed strategy to find the solution, and the game will produce a fixed cycle 
route as follows: D-2『M-2』＝＞ M-1『D-2』 ＝＞D-1『M-1』＝＞ M-2『D-1』 
Step 5: Dissolve the reward matrixes of D and M.  
Both parties use their own estimated reward values as the values in the reward matrixes to 
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D D-1 3 2 D-2 1 4 
Table 7. Expected reward matrix of distributor 
(1) The left side of the mixed strategy is the attacking side (find out expected benefit), the 
upper side is the defense side (find expected loss): 
D: Assume M chooses the M-1 Strategy
The probability of responding with the D-1 strategy is p, and with the D-2, strategy is 1-p. 
  
3p + 1(1 – p) = 1 + 2p                                                                           
Assume M chooses the M-2 strategy 
The probability of responding with the D-1strategy is p, and with the D-2, strategy is 1-p. 
  
2p + 4(1 – p) = 4 – 2p                                                                                                               
We can find 1 + 2p = 4 – 2p  4p = 3  p = 75% 
The expected benefit of D is: 
M-1: 5.225.0175.03)( =×+×=DEG                     (5)                                                                       
M-2: 5.225.0475.02)( =×+×=DEG                     (6)                                                                       
(2) After exchanging the roles of both parties, it is possible to figure out the expected loss 
of M and the probability of the response strategy by M: 
M: Assume D chooses the D-1 strategy
The probability of responding with the M-1strategy is p, and with the M-2 strategy is 1-p. 
   
3p + 2(1 – p) = 2 + p                                                                                                                   
Assume D chooses D-2 strategy
The probability of responding with the M-1strategy is p, and with the M-2 strategy is 1-p. 
   
1p + 4(1 – p) = 4 – 3p                                                                                                                 
We can find out  2 + p = 4 - 3p  4p = 2  p=50% 
The expected loss of M is: 
D-1: 5.25.025.03)( =×+×=MEL                    (7)                                                                             
D-2: 5.25.045.01)( =×+×=MEL                    (8)                                                                             
(3) Use the ordinary method to find the solution to the matrix, adopt the max-min theory to 
determine expected loss and expected benefit, and then compare with the values of a 
mixed strategy: Distributor D (the attacking side) adopts the principle of selecting the 
bigger one over the small ones, anticipating a maximum reward with minimum benefits. 
They will therefore obtain a reward value of 2. However, if D adopts a mixed strategy 
to fin a solution, then the expected reward value could increase to 2.5. Therefore, 
distributor D should adopt a mixed strategy to find a solution. 
(4) Manufacturer M (the defense side) adopts the principle of selecting the smaller one over 
the big ones, expecting minimum loss in a situation of maximum losses. They will 
obtain a loss value of 3. If M adopts a mixed strategy to find a solution, the expected 
loss could decrease to 2.5. Therefore, manufacturer M should adopt a mixed strategy to 
find a solution. 
(5) What follows is a summary of the results of both parties’ strategy calculations and a 
reorganization of each probability adopting various strategies by both parties: The 
probability for D to choose D-1 is 75% and D-2 is 25%; the probability for M to choose 
M-1 is 50% and M-2 is 50% (as Fig. 7 shows). Therefore, the strategy combination with 
the highest probability (in which both parties think it could secure higher benefit for 
them) is that D adopts the D-1 strategy and M adopts the M-1 strategy. 
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Figure 7. Distributor agent initial result 
(6) Under the same condition, it is possible to use the reward values set by M to figure out 
a strategy combination and solution acceptable to both parties. The probability for M to 
select M-1 is 25% and M-2 is 75%; the probability for D to choose D-1 is 50% and D-2 
is 50% (as Fig. 8 shows). Therefore, the strategy combination with the highest 
probability (in which both parties think it could secure a higher benefit for them) is 
when D adopts the D-1 strategy and M adopts the M-2 strategy. 
 
 
Figure 8. Manufacturer agent initial result 





D D-1 （2,3） 
Table 8. The Final Reward Matrix 
Finally, this paper considers only the strategy of M and not the strategy choice of D, 
because for D, the D-1 strategy is a better strategy choice and can secure a higher reward. 
Therefore, in the final strategy combination, D adopts the D-1 strategy and M adopts the M-2 
strategy (as Fig. 9 shows). 
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Figure 9. Final result produced from the system 
7. Result and Discussion 
The Cooperative Strategy for Multi-agent System Model introduced in this study quickly and 
automatically found the strategy combination. Both parties can secure the maximum reward 
through multi-agents under different situations and conditions. The information about strategy 
could be made public to the maximum extent. Not every player in the game has the same 
conditions, there is a strong and a weak one that often leads to the collapse of the game 
(unable to find the Nash Equilibrium in which both parties secure the same reward). For the 
mediation of conflicts between the strategies of both parties, the Cooperative Strategy for 
Multi-agent System Model offers a strategy option in which both parties can expect the 
maximum reward. For the example in this study, the situation in which the mediation could 
not produce a Nash Equilibrium solution is an indefinite cycle. However, the model that this 
study introduces could produce a strategy combination acceptable to both parties. The 
expected reward is 2 if the attacking side in the combination adopts the principle of selecting 
the bigger one over the small ones, whereas the expected reward of the strategy combination 
is 2.5. Therefore, distributor D wants to adopt a mixed strategy to find a solution. From the 
perspective of manufacturer M, the expected loss is 3 if the defense side has to adopt the 
principle of selecting the small one over the bigger ones, whereas the expected loss of the 
strategy combination is 2.5. Therefore, manufacturer M will be pleased to accept the strategy 
option. This point marks the achievement of the final goal of the conflict resolution of 
strategies. 
8. Conclusion 
This study provides a case discussion and attempts to integrate and validate the application of 
the theory model, and advises future research. The strategy action game is not only applicable 
in the field of commercial negotiation; subsequent research can extend further into the fields 
of education and society. The competition and cooperation relationship between manufacturer 
and distributor in other applications are delicate, allowing room for other methods besides 
strategy action game, such as series bargaining game and mean difference. This study 
performs the analysis aiming at the strategy application, and intervenes into the negotiation 
harmonization with the manufacturer or distributor. On one hand, it insists on an objective 
observation attitude; on the other, it may also produce the deviation of unscrambling the 
behavior of game participants subjectively. 
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